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Abstract
We explore the link between uncertainty in economic policy, firm-level FDI, and
firm hedging behavior – building upon a newspaper-based index of economic
policy uncertainty (EPU). We find that the relative difference in EPU between
home and host country has a significant relationship with FDI. Firms increase
their FDI level in countries, which have a low level of EPU relative to their home
country. In addition, firms use derivatives more intensively in response to an
increase in EPU. Interestingly, the link between EPU and corporate derivatives
use varies according to the type of firm. Domestic MNCs make the most
effective use of derivatives to hedge against EPU exposure.
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INTRODUCTION
Derivatives use has always been a matter of great interest among
academics and policymakers.1 By definition, derivatives are
instruments aiming to protect participants in financial markets
from adverse movements in prices of the underlying assets. In this
study, we explore a positive aspect of derivatives by viewing them
as a firm management tool to address risk and uncertainty
(Bartram, Brown, & Conrad, 2011). Existing studies use various
proxies to measure the level of uncertainty firms are exposed to.
This includes stock return volatility, the dispersion in analyst
forecasts, and input and output prices, as well as certain types of
macroeconomic policy, including fiscal, monetary, and social
security policies. Other studies use the country’s risk level (Asiri,
2014; Kim, Papanastassiou, & Nguyen, 2016) or change in
political regimes (Durnev, 2010). These studies have provided
important insights into risk and uncertainty factors driving firm
behavior. In this study, we focus on Economic Policy Uncertainty,
an important but unexplored source of uncertainty relating to
economic policy.2 Hereafter we use the acronym EPU to refer to
this uncertainty. We explore whether EPU plays a consistent and
significant role in explaining firm-level FDI and corporate
derivative.
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Before moving on, we would like to clarify
exactly what EPU refers to in this study. In line
with Baker, Bloom, and Davis (2016) and Davis
(2016), we focus on uncertainty regarding who
makes economic policy decisions, what economic
policy actions will be undertaken and when, and
the economic effects of policy actions (or inaction).
We explore both near-term aspects (e.g., when the
government adjusts its policy rate) and longer-term
aspects (e.g., how to implement entitlement pro-
grams). In doing so, our study contributes to the
emerging literature initiated by the influential work
of Bloom (2009). This strand of literature focuses on
the role of policy uncertainty in determining firm
behavior. Firms are often exposed to a significant
amount of uncertainty about the timing and con-
tent of government policy changes. The uncer-
tainty of future policy decisions can significantly
increase the uncertainty related to firms’ activities
and influence firms’ perception of risk. On the
other hand, because derivatives are an important
instrument for firms to address risk exposure, it is of
interest to explore the link between EPU, deriva-
tives use, and firm-level FDI.
To better understand the motivation behind our
approach, we consider an August 12, 2015 news
report from the widely circulated English-language
newspaper, China Daily: ‘‘PBOC signals impor-
tant change in managing the exchange rate.’’ This
story highlighted the unanticipated move by
the People’s Bank of China (PBOC) to depreci-
ate its daily fixing for the Chinese Yuan against
the US dollar. This news conveys uncertainty in
China’s exchange rate policy, not only in terms of
the timing of its implementation, but also its
impact on the economy once implemented. We
wonder how this uncertainty is correlated with the
firm performance. In relation, because derivatives
are a firm’s risk management instrument, it makes
sense to explore whether firms use derivatives
more intensively in response to policy
uncertainty.3
Our study relates to a newspaper-based index of
economic policy uncertainty (EPU) that builds
upon a novel method by Baker et al. (2016).
Relative to other text sources and types of data,
the newspaper-based EPU indices contain useful
information about the extent and nature of eco-
nomic policy uncertainty. Also, these indices can
be extended to many countries and can look back
in time. In the context of our study, the EPU index
enables us to objectively observe the amount of
uncertainty leading up to, and following, the
passage of economic policies for a cross-section of
eight countries in our sample. It allows for a
continuous tracking of policy uncertainty com-
pared with the alternatives, such as elections. It is
also worth noting that instead of focusing on
particular types of policy – such as monetary policy
– we focus on the overall level of EPU in the
economy, and hence its aggregate effect on firm
behavior.
We contribute to the literature by linking
national policy uncertainty to firms’ real manage-
rial decision-making – in this case FDI and corporate
derivatives use. Our study quantifies the effect of
EPU on firm level FDI and hedging behavior. An
interesting feature of this study is that it explores
policy uncertainty in various countries across time.
We focus the analysis on a sample of 881 non-
financial firms from eight East Asian countries from
2003 to 2013. We chose this sample for the follow-
ing reasons. First, although literature on derivatives
use has blossomed, most empirical studies focus on
non-financial, American firms; research on hedging
behavior among East Asian firms remains relatively
scarce, even though they have become the world’s
key derivatives users.4 Second, our sampled firms are
located in countries with different economic and
financial development levels, from the world’s third
and second largest economies (Japan and China), to
newly industrialized countries (Singapore and Hong
Kong), and then emerging markets (Thailand, the
Philippines, Indonesia, andMalaysia). Additionally,
these sample countries are also heterogeneous in
terms of economic, political, and business environ-
ments. Country heterogeneity allows us to focus on
differences in economic policy uncertainty that is
arguably exogenous to firm derivative use. Lastly,
given that our sample mainly consists of domestic
firms – nearly 45% – we would expect the role of
EPU to become more salient in driving firm
behavior.
Our study also contributes to international busi-
ness literature in two aspects. First, we highlight the
role of EPU in deriving firm’s FDI. Specifically, we
show that difference in EPU between home and
host country has a significant relationship with
level of FDI flow from home-based firms to host
country. Second, we examine whether the level of
exposure to EPU – which we define as the percent-
age change in the rate of return on a firm’s
common stock against a 1% change in the EPU
index – is conditional on the type of firm. Most
existing studies on exposure focus exclusively on
multinational corporations (hereafter MNCs)
Policy uncertainty, Hedging behavior, and FDI Quang Nguyen and Trang Kim
Journal of International Business Studies
simply because MNCs engage more in overseas
operation and trade (see Bartov and Bodnar, 1994;
Faff and Marshall, 2005). Yet a purely domestic firm
is exposed to EPU in the home country to a large
extent. Whether MNCs are more exposed than
domestic firms is not well understood. In relation,
although the benefits of hedging from reducing
exposure are well established, little is known about
whether derivative activities of MNCs are associ-
ated with a greater reduction in exposure than
other firms. In this study, we explore the link
between derivatives use and exposure to EPU by
comparing three types of firms: domestic firms,
MNCs, and foreign affiliates. Further, our study
covers the 2003–2013 period, which provides a
natural experiment to investigate the dynamic
relationship between EPU exposure and derivatives
use when firms faced exogenous shocks caused by
the global financial crisis of 2007–2008.
Our main findings can be summarized as follows.
We find a positive relationship between the ratio of
EPU at home country to EPU at host country and
FDI. In addition, EPU is negatively associated with
firm performance. It also increases the use of
derivatives, after controlling for firm-specific fac-
tors. This effect is distinct from general economic
risk and uncertainty in each country, as well as
global economic uncertainty. We also provide an
interesting finding – the use of financial derivatives
by domestic firms and domestic MNCs significantly
contributes to a reduction in exposure to domestic
country EPU. Interestingly, compared to domestic
firms and foreign affiliates, derivatives use by MNCs
is more effective in reducing EPU exposure.
SOME BACKGROUND INFORMATION
While firms in East Asian countries have been
playing an important role as active participants in
derivatives markets, the reasons why East Asian
non-financial firms hedge are not well explored.
Likewise, the fundamental questions whether the
use of derivatives increases firm value and/or
reduces exposures that firms face are still unknown.
While firms in the US and Europe have quite
similar economic, financial, and social environ-
ments, our sample of East Asian countries has a
great heterogeneity in economic and institutional
environments. Regarding risk exposure, Pan, Fok,
and Liu (2007) show that exposure to foreign
exchange risk by Asia–Pacific firms appears to be
much more widespread than is typical for the large,
Western industrialized economies. Further, the
extent of their exchange rate exposure has not
diminished over the last decade. Kho and Stulz
(2000) studied the currency exposure of the bank-
ing sector in five East Asian countries during the
Asian financial crisis. They found that currency
depreciations had a negative impact on the sector’s
stock returns only in Indonesia and the Philippines.
Relatedly, Muller and Verschoor (2007) find that
the number of firms that are significantly exposed
to US dollar exchange risk contemporaneously
varies from 20.5% in Singapore to 30% in Thailand,
while the number of firms exposed to Japanese yen
exchange risk varies from 20% in Hong Kong to
27% in Indonesia.
The literature on the link between derivatives and
risk exposure among East Asian firms is still few.
Parsley and Popper (2006) find that firms in East Asia
were less hedged under pegged exchange rates.
Allayannis, Brown, & Klapper (2003) study the
exchange rate hedging practices in eight East Asian
countries between 1996 and 1998 by exploring the
relative performance of hedgers during and after the
crisis. They note that using derivatives does not
reduce foreign exchange exposure by East Asian
firms – those that used derivatives before the crisis
performed just as poorly as non-users during the
crisis. During post-crisis, derivatives use somewhat
improved firm performance, but this result appears
to be explained by an exchange rate risk premium.
RELATED LITERATURE AND HYPOTHESIS
DEVELOPMENT
Related Literature
Our study directly relates to literature on the effect
of government policy on firm behavior. Govern-
ments shape the environment in which firms
operate by setting the rules of the game through
policy formation and regulations.5 They levy taxes,
provide subsidies, enforce laws, regulate competi-
tion, and define environmental policies, among
other things. Government economic policy often
has significant impacts, which are largely non-
diversifiable. Thus, firms make real economic deci-
sions based on expectations about the future eco-
nomic policy environment, which is naturally
uncertain. Pa´stor and Veronesi (2012) make a
distinction between two types of uncertainty: pol-
icy uncertainty and political uncertainty. Policy
uncertainty relates to the uncertain impact of a
given government policy on the profitability of the
private sector. Political uncertainty, on the other
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hand, is broadly defined as uncertainty about the
government’s future actions.
To proxy for political uncertainty, Julio and Yook
(2012) and Durnev (2010) use election years. Julio
& Yook (2012) find that corporate investment falls
around national elections, while Durnev (2010)
finds that corporate investment is 40% less sensi-
tive to stock prices in election years. Huang, Wu,
Yu, and Zhang (2015) use crisis events as a proxy for
political risk to explore their effect on corporate
payout policy. They find that political risk makes
existing dividend payers more likely to terminate
dividends and non-payers less likely to initiate
dividends. In relation to these studies – and in the
spirit of the Baker, Bloom, and Davis (2016) index –
the index of economic policy uncertainty devel-
oped in this study complements and adds value to
them. For instance, election years do not capture
the heterogeneity in policy uncertainty that may
occur between elections. Intuitively, such hetero-
geneity is likely significant given the infrequency of
elections and the many uncertainty-inducing
events that happen in non-election years, such as
debate over the stimulus package, the debt ceiling
dispute, wars, and financial crashes.6
Studies on the relationship between policy uncer-
tainty and investment find a negative correlation,
i.e., an increase in uncertainty predicts a reduction in
investment. There are various reasons for a depress-
ing effect of uncertainty on investment. Bernanke
(1983) shows that firms delay investment in the face
of uncertainty associated with changes in the coun-
try’s monetary, fiscal, or macroeconomic policies.
Bloom, Bond, and Van Reenen (2007) show that a
change in the regulatory environment increases real
option values, making firms more cautious when
investing or disinvesting. On the other hand, Julio
and Yook (2012) argue that declined investment
expenditures might occur during times of political
uncertainty around national elections.
Baker et al. (2016) provide further insights into this
interesting strand of literature by proposing a news-
paper-based index of EPU to objectively measure
policy uncertainty.7 Given the increasing trend of
policy changes observed in the US, it is expected that
policy uncertaintymay becomemore important over
time. Using the Baker et al. (2016) index, Gulen and
Ion (2015) find a strong negative relationship
between firm-level capital investment and the aggre-
gate level of policy uncertainty. Finally, using a
variation of the Baker et al. (2016) measure and
extending it to an international setting, Brogaard and
Detzel (2015) find that when economic policy
uncertainty increases by 1%, market returns fall by
2.9% and stock market volatility rises by 18%.
Literature on Firm Specifics and Derivative Use
There have been a great number of studies on firm-
level determinants of the use of derivatives. Due to
space constraint, we focus on the most relevant
studies. Modigiliani and Miller’s (1958) seminal
paper shows that the efficient market financing
policy of firms is irrelevant – hedging does not affect
firm value. Hence, the incentives of hedging are
built onmarket imperfections and on situations that
hedging can increase the expected cash flows of
firms. Existing evidence, however, provides mixed
support for the theories of hedging. Judge (2006)
finds a robust relationship between financial distress
costs and foreign currency hedging decisions, which
is much stronger than in many previous studies in
the UK. Recently, Chen and King (2014) examined
1832 non-financial American firms and present
significant evidence that is consistent with financial
distress cost arguments. In contrast, Charumathi
and Kota (2012) state that no evidence exists to
support this hypothesis. Supanvanij and Strauss
(2010) find that tax loss carry-forwards are an
important factor in determining the use of foreign
currency derivatives, while Kumar and Rabinovitch
(2013) indicate that firms use derivatives to increase
the present value of tax losses. In contrast, Gay, Lin,
and Smith (2011) do not find any evidence in
support of the tax incentive to increase debt capac-
ity. Finally, in a series of studies in the gold mining
industry Tufano (2003) notes that hedging is an
important risk management instrument; yet Brown,
Crabb, and Haushalter (2006) find that selective
hedging is rarely successful among firms who are
unlikely to have an informational advantage.
Empirical studies on testing the agency cost of
debt theory also provide inconclusive evidence.
Chen and King (2014) find evidence to support
agency costs of debt theory. Yet Charumathi and
Kota (2012) do not find evidence in support of the
agency cost of debt hypothesis. This finding is
consistent with a recent study by Lievenbru¨ck and
Schmid (2014), and earlier studies such as Nance,
Smith, and Smithson (1993).8
Hypothesis Development
Linking EPU and FDI
Economic policies have important implications for
taxation, spending, monetary and trade policy, and
industry regulation. Uncertainty in policy may
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influence firm fundamentals, such as investment
opportunities, cash flows, or risk-adjusted discount
factors. Baker et al. (2016), alongwithGulen and Ion
(2015), report that a rise in economic policy uncer-
tainty signals a significant decrease in corporate
investment. Regarding FDI, Beazer and Blake (2011)
argue that firms compare uncertainty across possible
investment locations, choosing the less risky option.
The default investment location, which represents
the baseline level of uncertainty, is the firm’s home
country. For example, Tallman (1988) and Grosse
and Trevino (1996) explore the effect of home
country political risk on firm’s decision to invest in
the US. They find that firms from countries with a
higher degree of internal political, economic, or
social instability show greater FDI into the US. In
doing so firms reduce exposure to home country
risks. Likewise, Lee and Song (2012) find significant
production shifts among foreign subsidiaries of
multinational corporations (MNCs), due to macroe-
conomic uncertainty in their host countries.
Building upon existing literature, we propose
that firms evaluate EPU abroad relative to the level
of EPU they experience at home. Firms are more
willing to invest in countries with a lower level of
EPU than their home country.
Hypothesis 1: A positive relationship exists
between FDI and the ratio of EPU at home
country to EPU at host country.
EPU and derivatives use
Given the importance of policy uncertainty in firm
performance, it is interesting to explore how firms
respond to EPU. In relation to extant literature, there
are two important and related questions. The first
question is how EPU differs from other fundamental
risks. The literature on EPU has shown it to be an
economically important risk factor, which differs
from other conventional and fundamental risks.
Pa´stor and Veronesi (2012, 2013) model firms with
differing exposure to policy uncertainty. They note
that policy risk premium differs from the more
traditional economic risk premia, which are driven
by fundamental shocks. The policy risk premium
compensates firms for political uncertainty, which
makes investors uncertain about which policy the
government might adopt in the future. In addition,
the risk premium induced by impact shocks repre-
sents compensation for a different aspect of uncer-
tainty about government policy – uncertainty about
the impact of the prevailing policy on profitability.
Importantly, Pa´stor and Veronesi (2012, 2013) posit
that firms with greater exposure to policy uncer-
tainty typically have higher expected returns,
although the phenomenon is state dependent and
can potentially have the opposite effect. Likewise,
innovations in policy uncertainty adversely affect
investment opportunities and firm performance by
increasing uncertainty.
In relation, Brogaard and Detzel (2015) note that
government taxation, expenditure, monetary, and
regulatory economic policies can have market-wide
economic effects, which are largely non-diversifi-
able. Firms make real economic decisions based on
expectations about the future economic policy
environment. As such, even market-benevolent
policymakers can increase risk by generating an
environment of uncertainty about their future eco-
nomic policy decisions. Brogaard and Detzel (2015)
also find that innovations in economic policy
uncertainty command a significant negative risk
premium in the cross-section of stock returns, even
when controlling for innovations in other uncer-
tainty measures in addition to market, size, value,
and momentum factors. Overall, there is a negative
contemporaneous correlation between changes in
EPU and market returns – as such the Brogaard and
Detzel (2015) study presents evidence suggesting
that EPU is an economically important risk factor.
The second question is why EPU causes firms to
hedge more. To explore this question, we incorpo-
rate EPU exposure – which we define as the
percentage change in the rate of return on a firm’s
common stock against a 1% change in the EPU
index. Our approach is in line with the literature on
firm exposure to risk and uncertainty (e.g., Hutson,
& Stevenson, 2010; Allayannis, & Weston, 2001).
Extant literature (e.g., Allayannis, & Weston, 2001)
finds that derivatives are an effective instrument to
hedge against exchange and interest rates. Like-
wise, we develop the analysis based on the reason-
ing that if derivatives prove to help firms reduce
exposure to EPU, firms will have incentive to use
derivatives more intensively.
Bartram et al. (2009) highlight that firms located
in countries with greater economic, financial, and
political risks are more likely to use derivatives. On
the other hand, firms based in less risky countries
may have lower expected financial distress costs
and less incentive for risk management. Recently,
Azad, Fang, and Hung (2012) and Kim, Papanastas-
siou and Nguyen (2016) found evidence that higher
degrees of economic, financial, and political risk
encourage firms to use derivatives more intensively.
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Because firms have been using financial deriva-
tives as important risk management instruments to
hedge exposure to market risks, we would expect
that these instruments enable firms to hedge pol-
icy-related uncertainty.9 Using a propensity score
matching (PSC) approach, Bartram et al. (2011)
note that overall, non-financial firms are motivated
to use derivatives for risk reduction. Huang et al.
(2015) suggest that uncertainty in government
policies may significantly increase how managers
perceive a firm’s cash flow risk, largely because the
cash flows of individual firms are exposed to both
idiosyncratic and aggregate shocks. Beber, Brandt,
and Kavajecz (2009) observe that higher macroeco-
nomic uncertainty leads to a greater increase in
derivatives trading volume, after macroeconomic
news and firms unwind those derivatives positions
shortly after that. This finding implies that firms
use options to hedge or speculate on macroeco-
nomic news.
Hypothesis 2: A positive relationship exists
between EPU and derivatives use; firms use
derivatives more intensively to reduce exposure
to EPU.
Hypothesis 2 suggests that firms use derivatives
more intensively in response to EPU. Naturally, we
wonder whether this response brings any benefit to
firms. We explore two potential benefits of using
derivatives related to firm performance and reduc-
ing exposure to EPU. Specifically, we examine the
role of derivatives in moderating the effect of EPU
on firm performance and explore how derivatives
enable a firm to respond efficiently to policy
uncertainty. Because derivatives are risk manage-
ment instruments, we expect that a firm can reduce
EPU exposure and the impact of policy uncertainty
on its performance using derivatives more inten-
sively. Our conjecture is built upon a number of
theoretical and empirical studies. In one theoretical
study, Bolton and Oehmke (2015) extend the
standard incomplete contracts framework in cor-
porate finance, by introducing derivative contracts
that allow firms to arrange state-contingent trans-
fers with separate derivative counterparties. Specif-
ically, derivatives allow for payments tied to
publicly observable and verifiable events that are
correlated with firms’ unobservable (or unverifi-
able) cash flow outcomes. Derivatives are supplied
by derivative counterparties that are subject to
moral hazard, which is mitigated via collateral
requirements, as observed in Biais et al. (2015).
Within this framework, Bolton and Oehmke (2015)
show that by allowing transfers of cash from world
states correlated with high-cash flow realizations to
states correlated with low-cash flow realizations,
derivative contracts help firms manage uncertainty
more effectively.
As for empirical studies, Bartram et al. (2011) find
that relative to firms that do not use derivatives,
derivative users have lower cash flow volatility,
idiosyncratic volatility, and systematic risk. Cam-
pello, Lin, Ma, and Zou (2011) show that derivative
use relaxes firm financing by reducing the likeli-
hood of states in which the costs of financial
distress are high and firms engage in risk-shifting.
Likewise, Chang, Hsin, and Shiah-Hou (2013)
describe the use of foreign currency derivatives as
‘real actions,’ since they directly mitigate the
impact of currency risk on the real cash flows of
firms. Zhou and Wang (2013) note that numerous
multinational companies nowadays resort to finan-
cial derivatives to reduce the adverse effect of
foreign exchange exposure in their value enhance-
ment activities. In sum, we propose that derivatives
enable firms to reduce exposure to EPU; hence, they
reduce the negative effect of EPU on firm
performance.
Hypothesis 3A: There is a negative relationship
between corporate derivatives use and exposure
to EPU.
Hypothesis 3B: More intensive use of deriva-
tives reduces the effect of EPU on firm perfor-
mance, as measured by Tobin’s Q.
Derivatives use and exposure by firm type
Hypothesis 3A proposes that there is a negative
relationship between derivatives use and exposure
to EPU. An interesting question is whether this
relationship is conditional on firm type. We use the
Corporate Affiliates database to classify firm types.
We distinguish between two types of domestic
firms, i.e., between uninational domestic firms –
firms with no overseas investments – and domestic
MNCs – firms that are part of a domestically owned
MNC. Similarly, foreign affiliates are the incoming
MNCs with a parent company based elsewhere in
the world (Pantzalis, Simkins, & Laux, 2001; Castel-
lani, & Zanfei, 2006).
We propose that a variation exists in the effect of
derivatives use, due to differences in firm-specific
resources and capabilities. In particular, such
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variation can be linked to firm-specific advantages
(FSAs) of MNCs and the distinctiveness of other firms.
Building upon internationalization theory (Buck-
ley, & Casson, 1976; Dunning, 1977), international
business scholars have found that MNCs should be
able to exploit cost differentials on a global scale
due to operation across borders (Allen & Pantzalis,
1996; Chung, Lee, Beamish, & Isobe, 2010). MNCs,
by virtue of their global scope and strategy and
their ability to span both internal and external
business networks across national boundaries
(Scott-Kennel & Giroud, 2015), can have advan-
tages in hedging exposure to a specific market or
country EPU. Likewise, the literature highlights the
advantages of MNCs in accessing international
capital markets and the ability to exploit market
imperfections through internal capital markets or
networks of international subsidiaries (Park, Suh, &
Yeung, 2013). These advantages enable MNCs to
better manage uncertainty related to home/host
countries’ regulations. In other words, FSAs enable
MNCs to achieve superior performance in hedging
against EPU.
In comparison to domestic firms, Dunning and
Lundan (2008) note that MNCs have more oppor-
tunities than domestic firms to utilize a combina-
tion of organizational and external resources to
spread market risks and enhance performance, by
means of multinationality. Extant studies (e.g.,
Hughes, Logue, & Sweeney, 1975; Fatemi, 1984;
Michel and Shaked, 1986) show evidence that
internationalization enables MNCs to have lower
systematic risk, idiosyncratic risk, and total risk
than domestic firms. Along this line, Allayannis
and Ofek (2001) and Choi and Jiang (2009) find
that MNCs may possess a superior capability to
reduce exposure to market risks by means of
derivatives. Dunning and Rugman (1985) further
indicate that MNCs have a greater degree of free-
dom than domestic firms. For example, while
domestic firms have to rely on limited financial
instruments to hedge their exposure, MNCs have
opportunities to engage in additional hedging tools
(Pantzalis et al., 2001).
The literature also emphasizes the importance of
country-specific advantages (CSAs) – including
economies of scale and access to natural resources
in the operation of domestic MNCs – and shows
that MNCs are better at exploiting CSAs than their
domestic counterparts (Bhaumik, Driffied, & Zhou,
2016). Likewise, Choi and Jiang (2009) find that
MNCs face smaller and less significant exchange
rate exposure than non-MNCs. These advantages
increase the competitive edge of MNCs over
domestic firms and enable MNCs to use derivatives
to reduce exposure to country and market risks
better than domestic firms.
Next, we explore the comparison between MNCs
and foreign affiliates. Recent IB and international
finance studies suggest that foreign affiliates tend to
be at a disadvantage as they often suffer from
liability of foreignness (Blass & Yafeh, 2001; Bell
et al., 2012). Foreign affiliates usually lack knowl-
edge about local cultures and networks connecting
them with important actors in host country’s
economy. They also have a weak link to local
institutional setting (Zaheer, 2002; Bell et al.,
2012). Thus, we would expect that foreign affiliates
face more difficulties in implementing derivatives
activities than domestic MNCs. These difficulties
reduce the effectiveness of derivatives in reducing
EPU exposure.
In sum, building upon extant literature, we
propose the following hypothesis:
Hypothesis 4: Derivatives use by domestic
MNCs is associated with a greater reduction in
EPU exposure than it is among domestic firms
and foreign affiliates.
RESEARCH DESIGN
The Policy Uncertainty Index
A key feature of this study is its exploration of the
link between policy uncertainty and firm hedging
behavior. As mentioned, developing an objective
measure for policy uncertainty is complicated.
Following Baker et al. (2016), we explore coverage
of policy-related economic uncertainty in leading
newspapers as an indicator for the intensity of
concerns about economic policy uncertainty.10 The
reasoning behind this approach is that when
certain kinds of uncertainty matter, they are likely
to be reported by journalists through the use of
certain words. More specifically, it is assumed that
the media is able to gauge any uncertainty indi-
cated by market outcomes, professional econo-
mists, and political debate, and to draw the
general public’s attention to this uncertainty
through the recurrent use of specific words.
To harvest news articles, we use Access World
News, which contains articles from leading
national papers and news sources from around
the world. We include articles in the policy uncer-
tainty index if they state, imply, or suggest any of
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the following: an uncertainty about what economic
policy will be adopted (with specific keywords);
whether or when it will be adopted; or uncertainty
about its economic effects. For the purpose of
linking policy uncertainty and derivatives use, we
parallel the Baker et al. (2016) approach by utilizing
the number of newspaper articles containing three
categories of terms related to each respective coun-
try: economy (E), policy (P), and uncertainty (U).
We use the following keywords: (E) {economic, econ-
omy} (U): uncertainty; uncertain; riskf g (P) {policy, reg-
ulation, legislation, government}. Our objective is to
select articles that discuss uncertainty about eco-
nomic policies in our sample countries. The mere
mention of a country’s name in an article does not
necessarily imply that its economic policy is uncer-
tain. Hence, we discard articles that only mention a
specific country, but are actually about uncertainty
in another country. All news searches were under-
taken in English, because Access World News
translates articles from native languages to English.
To help develop suitable E, P, and U term sets, we
consulted persons with native-level fluency and
economic expertise in the relevant language and
country.11
To develop our EPU index, we consider the
leading newspapers in each country of our sample
– such as the South China Morning Post, China Daily,
Asahi, Yumiuri, the Business Times, the Straits Times,
The Standard, Daily Express, Malaysia Today, Pattaya
Mail, and The Bali Times. Like Baker et al. (2016), we
scale the raw counts by the total number of articles
in these newspapers that satisfy our search criteria,
in the same newspaper for each East Asian country
in our sample. This process yields an EPU series for
each country, which we normalize to unit standard
deviation for the 2003–2013 time period. Finally,
we rescale the EPU series to an average value of 100
from 2003 to 2013.
It is worth exploring the link between our
constructed EPU index and some significant events
happened in our sample countries. For instance,
the incidence related to August 12, 2015 news
mentioned in the introduction corresponds to a
change of 11.25% increases in EPU. The political
coup in Thailand in 2006 was reflected by a
significant increase of 28.86% in EPU during that
year. Likewise, election in the Philippines in 2010 is
associated with a 25.22% increase in EPU in the
Philippines during that period. These examples
highlight the relevance of our EPU index in
capturing uncertainty at national level.
Measures of Corporate Use of Derivatives
We collected the information about derivatives use
from firms’ annual reports. Until now, information
about the notional principal amount of derivative
instruments is considered an off-balance sheet
item; therefore, there is no database containing
data about derivatives use of non-financial firms in
East Asian countries. Hence, we hand-collected
these data directly from annual reports. We verified
data accuracy by searching a subset of firms’ annual
reports. The electronic annual reports in PDF
format were obtained via websites of each firm, or
from Morningstar, an independent investment
research company that links directly to each com-
pany’s recent annual report, or from the stock
exchanges of each country. Because the eight
countries in our sample have different local cur-
rencies with different values, it may result in
sampling bias. Hence, we used the common cur-
rency for the amount of derivatives use; for all
other financial data we used US dollars (USD). For
annual reports in which reporting currency was not
USD, we converted all hand-collected data into
USD using exchange rates from the Datastream
database. We augmented this database on deriva-
tives use from annual reports, with financial data
on explanatory variables from the Datastream
database. For data not available on Datastream,
we searched annual reports of firms to fill in as
much missing data as possible.
Next, to measure how intensely a firm uses
derivatives, we construct a continuous variable,
which is defined as the total notional amount of
derivative contracts scaled by the firm size for a user
and zero for a non-user. We searched annual
reports for information about the use of derivatives
and classify firms as users if their annual reports
specifically mentioned the use of any type of
derivative contracts – forwards, swaps, futures,
and options. Almost every firm stated that they
did not enter into derivative contracts for trading
or speculation purposes; we therefore assume that
all firms in our sample use derivatives mainly for
hedging.
We do not use accounting definitions because
accounting standards differ across countries, and
accounting classification does not always reveal a
firm’s intention for holding a derivative position.
We focus on textual descriptions; as such, a firm is
classified as a derivatives user if it has any numer-
ical or narrative disclosure of derivatives use in a
fiscal year. Applying this measure, we are able to
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investigate the use of derivatives for a large sample
of firms over a long period of time.
Sample Selection
Like Kim, Papanastassiou and Nguyen (2016), we
focus the analysis on 881 non-financial firms across
various industries located in eight East Asian
countries (Singapore, Hong Kong, the Philippines,
Thailand, Malaysia, Indonesia, China, and Japan)
from 2003 to 2013.12 Please refer to Appendix C for
further discussion on our sample selection.
Although we use the same sample of firms as Kim
et al. (2017), the two studies differ in many ways.
Kim et al. focus on the link between derivatives and
institutional/national governance quality such as
corruption, rules of law, and country risk. In this
article, we explore the role of EPU in driving firm’s
FDI and hedging behavior. On the one hand, EPU is
a more objective measure of uncertainty than
institutional quality. On the other hand, we have
spent a part of the article to show that the EPU
contains uncertain aspects of macroeconomic envi-
ronment – which have not been captured by
institutional quality. The link between EPU and
derivatives use is highly significant – even after
controlling for institutional quality.
It is worth noting that our sample consists of 389
domestic firms, 427 domestic MNCs, and 65 foreign
affiliates (Table 1). We use the Corporate Affiliates
database to classify firm types. We distinguish
between two types of domestic firms, i.e., between
uninational domestic firms – firms with no overseas
investments – and domestic MNCs – firms that are
part of a domestically owned MNC. Similarly,
foreign affiliates are the incoming MNCs with a
parent company based elsewhere in the world
(Pantzalis et al., 2001; Castellani & Zanfei, 2006).
Summary statistics on the use of derivatives by the
sample firms is reported in Table 2. Across all
countries, approximately 53.5% of our sample
observations use at least one type of derivative,
while the usage rate in Japan, the Philippines, and
Thailand is 100%, indicating that derivatives use is
common among non-financial firms in East Asian
countries. Firms using foreign currency derivatives
account for 42.55%.
EMPIRICAL RESULTS AND ANALYSIS
For ease of exposition, we first elaborate on the key
variables in our analysis.
Firm Specifics
Operational hedging
Empirical research documents that many firms
actively manage exposure to market risks through
the use of operational hedging (Choi & Jiang, 2009;
Pantzalis et al., 2001; Bergho¨fer & Lucey, 2014) – as
in Pantzalis et al. (2001) – so it is necessary to
control for operational hedging to understand firm
exposure. We use the dummy variable GEOMARKT,
which has a value of one for firms that have sales
Table 1 Definitions of variables
Variables Definitions Sources
k^ijt





 Absolute value of exposure to country EPU of firm i located in country j in yeart Authors’
estimation
EPU Economic policy uncertainty index Authors’
calculation
Control variables
Firm size Natural logarithm of market value of total assets scaled by producer price index (PPI) Datastream
Leverage Total debt to total assets Datastream
FORSALES Foreign sales to total sales Datastream
GEOMARKT Dummy variable which has a value of one for firms that have sales markets in foreign
countries and zero otherwise
Authors’
construction
Cross-listed
Industrial
diversification
Dummy variable which has a value of one for cross-listed firms and zero otherwise
Dummy variable which equals one for firms operating in more than one business
segment in the SIC industry classification and zero otherwise
Authors’
construction
GDP per capita (Gross domestic products (GDP)/midyear population) World Bank
Financial system
deposits to GDP
The demand, time, saving deposits in deposit money banks, and other financial
institutions as a share of GDP
World Bank
Rule of law Index measuring the confidence of agents in abiding by the rules of society, the quality of
contract enforcement, and property rights with -2.5 (weak) to 2.5 (strong)
World Bank
This table summarizes predictions and defines the firm-specific and country-specific variables
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markets in foreign countries and zero otherwise.
We use the diversification dummy, which equals
one for firms operating in more than one business
segment in the SIC industry classification and zero
otherwise.
International involvement
It is well established in the existing literature that
foreign sale ratios are important determinants of
exposure (Jorion, 1990; Bodnar & Wong, 2000;
Allayannis & Ofek, 2001), as they indicate that
firms with a large proportion of foreign sales tend
to be more exposed to market risks. Following
Allayannis and Ofek (2001), we use the ratio of
foreign sales to total sales, denoted as FORSALES, to
measure a firm’s degree of international involve-
ment in this study.
Firm size
Recent studies have identified that smaller firms are
more subject to market risk exposure than larger
firms (Pantzalis et al., 2001; Hutson & Stevenson,
2010), and MNCs are associated with smaller and
less significant exchange rate exposure than non-
MNCs (Choi & Jiang, 2009). Thus, we use the
natural logarithm of the book value of total assets
as a proxy for firm size.
Leverage
The extent to which a firm is exposed to market
risks has been shown to depend on leverage (He &
Ng, 1998) as the use of derivatives reduces expected
financial distress and bankruptcy costs (Smith &
Stulz, 1985; Froot, Scharfstein, & Stein, 1993). We
therefore use the ratio of total debts to total assets
as our definition of leverage.
Industrial diversification
It is of interest to explore whether diversification
reduces firm exposure to risk and uncertainty. We
control for the effect of industrial diversification on
firm value using the diversification dummy, which
equals one for firms operating in more than one
business segment in the SIC industry classification
and zero otherwise.
Country-level Control Variables
We use GDP per capita to proxy for relative country
performance, and financial system deposits to GDP
to proxy for financial market development. We
choose these two variables because an increase in
GDP per capita and financial system deposits to
GDP gestures growth in the economy and tends to
signal a reduction in market risks. Additionally,
Hutson and Stevenson (2010) find a significant
negative link between exposure and the extent of
creditor protection in a country. Thus, we use rule
of law to proxy for country governance quality.
Summary Statistics
Table 3 presents summary statistics for both firm-
and country-specific variables described in the pre-
vious section for the sample firms. The means of
exposure coefficients for EPU reported in the second
column show that domestic firms have the highest
overall exposure, while domestic MNCs have less
exposure than domestic firms and foreign affiliates.
On the comparison between derivative users and
non-users for domestic firms, panel A shows that
derivative users have lower average exposure to EPU
than non-users. This, however, is not statistically
significant at any standard level. Yet we observe
that derivative users have both significant lower
average exposure to exchange rate and interest rate
risks than non-users.
For domestic MNCs, the results indicate that
derivatives users have lower overall exposure than
non-users – as expected. All exposure of derivatives
users is less relative to non-users and shows statisti-
cally significant differences inmeans at any standard
level. Similarly, foreign affiliate derivatives users
have lower exposure to EPU. A rather unexpected
finding is that users have a higher exchange rate
exposure than non-users. The mean difference,
however, is not significant at standard levels.
MULTIVARIATE ANALYSIS
In this section, we will implement different model
specifications to address our hypotheses. First, to
test Hypothesis 1 we will explore the link between
EPU and FDI. We then move on to investigate the
determinants of derivative uses as elaborated in
Hypothesis 2. Next, we explore the role of deriva-
tives in reducing firm’s exposure to EPU – by type of
firms – as discussed in Hypotheses 3A, 3B, and 4.
Linking EPU and FDI
To explore the link between EPU and FDI, we
combine the firms in our data with the fDi Markets
database based on firm name.13 fDi Markets
database is an online database maintained by fDi
Intelligence – a specialist division of the Financial
Times Ltd. It contains information about FDI
projects, the location, and the year of investment.
The database is continually updated using media
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announcements of cross-border greenfield invest-
ments covering all sectors and countries worldwide.
For the current article, we are interested in firms
being originated in 8 countries and also investing
in 8 countries of our study. Further, we focus on
domestic MNEs in our sample.
In line with Duanmu (2014), we implement the
following model specification:
FDIihstþ1 ¼ bþ b1
EPUhst
EPUfst
þ bXihst þ vCkst þ eikst :
This specification models the scale of FDI by firm
i in the home country h in the year t - FDIihst+1.
The s term is an index for the industry classifica-
tion. The f term is an index for the host country.
Dependent variable FDI is measured by the
natural log of the amount of investment (million
US$).
Independent variable EPUhstEPUfst represents the relative
EPU of home (h) to host country (f).
Xihst is a vector of firm specifics defined above.
Ckst is a vector control variable including the
natural log of the GDP per head in current US$,
proportion of total unemployment, natural
resource measured by the percentage of metal and
ore in country’s total export, real exchange rate,
and distance as measured by the natural log of
Table 3 Summary statistics: derivatives users versus non-users
Variables All firms Users Non-users Difference in means P value
Obs Mean Mean Mean Non-users - Users
Panel A: Domestic firm
EPU exposure 3959 0.6226 0.5668 0.7628 0.196 0.040**
FX risks exposure 3959 0.1468 0.1226 0.2642 0.1416 0.022**
IR risks exposure 3959 0.1228 0.5604 0.9068 0.3463 0.007***
Firm size 4218 5.43 5.7169 5.1739 -0.543 0.000***
Leverage 4237 25.016 23.823 26.072 2.2484 0.309
FORSALES 2952 41.836 42.566 41.147 -1.4191 0.323
GEOMART 3787 0.5147 0.5014 0.5263 0.0249 0.124
Diversification indicator 4158 0.3942 0.4035 0.3857 -0.0177 0.241
Tobin’s Q 4218 0.4556 0.5226 0.4252 0.0974 0.06*
Derivatives intensity 4218 0.1565
Panel B: Domestic MNCs
EPU exposure 4390 0.6224 0.4668 0.6558 0.189 0.001***
FX risks exposure 4390 0.1822 0.1628 0.2246 0.0614 0.056*
IR risks exposure 4390 0.5246 0.4226 0.6828 0.2602 0.001**
Firm size 4603 6.3791 7.0131 5.6861 -1.326 0.000***
Leverage 4620 23.754 22.89 24.697 1.8069 0.137
FORSALES 3219 31.995 32.842 30.83 -2.0124 0.091*
GEOMART 4368 0.7704 0.785 0.7549 -0.03 0.018**
Diversification indicator 4565 0.5301 0.5454 0.5131 -0.0322 0.068*
Tobin’s Q 4603 0.6228 0.8116 0.4226 0.389 0.001***
Derivatives intensity 4603 0.1627
Panel C: Foreign affiliates
EPU exposure 679 0.6828 0.6226 0.6557 0.0331 0.043
FX risks exposure 679 0.2577 0.2256 0.2488 0.0232 0.967
IR risks exposure 679 0.9226 0.8776 0.9826 0.115 0.076**
Firm size 704 5.4215 5.6719 5.2502 -0.4216 0.015**
Leverage 702 29.937 24.466 33.699 9.2331 0.431
FORSALES 507 34.418 36.44 32.752 -3.688 0.245
GEOMART 675 0.6592 0.6212 0.6836 0.0624 0.098*
Diversification indicator 704 0.4218 0.3298 0.4866 0.1567 0.000***
Tobin’s Q 704 0.7146 0.7156 0.7225 -0.0069 0.11
Derivatives intensity 704 0.1488
Note: This table presents the summary statistics of characteristics for firms that use derivatives and firms that do not. Panel A reports summary statistics
for the variables for the domestic firms. Panel B displays the mean, standard deviation for variables of domestic MNCs, only separately for derivatives
users and non-users. Panel C presents these values for foreign affiliates only. p values for testing the difference in mean are also reported. Asterisks ***, **,
and * indicate significance at the 1, 5, and 10% level, respectively.
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distance between home’s capital and host’s capital
city.
Table 4 presents the relationship between FDI and
its determinants. The correlations between FDI and
its determinants are mostly in the expected direc-
tions (see Duanmu, 2014). The key finding is the
positive correlation between the ratio of EPU at
home to EPU at host country (b = 0.016, p\0.008).
Firms are more likely to make FDI in countries,
which have a low level of EPU relative to their home
state. This result remains unchanged when we
include firm specifics and other macroeconomic
variables – as well as the year and industry fixed
effects. Our findings are in line with Tallman (1988),
Grosse and Trevino (1996), Duanmu (2014) who
note a significant link between FDI and relative
political risk between home and host countries.
Overall, the results confirm Hypothesis 1 on the
positive relationship between the ratio of EPU in
home to host country and firm-level FDI.
Linking EPU and Firm Hedging Behavior
Next, we conduct a multivariate analysis to explore
the link between EPU and derivatives use. We
implement the following model specifications:
Derivativei;j; t
TAi;j;t1
¼ ai þ bEPUj; t þ cXi; t þ dMj; t þ ei;j; t
where Derivativei,t is the amount of derivative that
firm i uses in year t.14 In line with existing literature
(Aretz & Bartram, 2010), we focus on the most
important type of derivatives: hedging against
exchange rate risk.
TAi,t-1 is firm i’s total asset in year t - 1, and EPUj,t
is the policy uncertainty index for firms located in
country j. As such,
Derivativei;j; t
TAi;j;t1
is a measure for
intensity in derivatives use.
ai is the firm’s fixed effect, Mj,t is a vector of
country j’s specific variables defined above, and Xi,t
is a vector of firm-specific variables defined above.
Following literature on pure cluster sampling, we
assume that the error term ei,j,t contains a common
country effect that can be separated in an additive
fashion, as in ei;j;t ¼ cj;t þ ui;j;t ; where cj,t is an
unobserved cluster (country) effect and ui,j,t is the
idiosyncratic error.
As in Wooldridge (2003), our model specification
can be referred to as a hierarchical linear model (HLM).
We cluster standard errors at the country level to
correct for potential cross-sectional and serial
Table 4 Linking EPU and firm-level FDI
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3
EPU home/EPU host (EPU ratio) 0.026***
(0.001)
0.022***
(0.005)
0.016***
(0.008)
Rule of law 0.011*
(0.06)
0.115*
(0.076)
Index of financial market development 0.005
(0.24)
0.008
(0.10)
Global economic uncertainty 0.002
(0.17)
0.08*
(0.08)
Distance between home and host 0.118
(0.16)
Log (GDP per capita ratio) 0.046*
(0.025)
0.056*
(0.02)
Log(GDP per capita ratio) 9 EPU ratio 0.026*
(0.06)
0.016
(0.11)
Corporate total tax (0.005)
(0.11)
Natural resource 0.005
Exchange rate (0.155)
0.010*
Control for firm specifics Yes Yes Yes
Industry fixed effect Yes Yes Yes
Year fixed effect Yes Yes Yes
No. of observations 856 856 856
Adjusted R-squared 0.22 0.25 0.32
Note: if p\0.10, * if p\0.05; ** if p\0.01; *** if p\0.001. We use the S&P 500 volatility index (VIX) to proxy for global policy uncertainty. Firm
specifics include variables listed in Table 1. Firm-specific variables include firm age, fixed asset, and profitability.
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correlation in the error term (Petersen, 2009). Fur-
ther, considering the small number of countries in
our sample,we followcloselyCameron,Gelbach, and
Miller (2008) to implement the wild cluster boot-
strap-t procedure. It is a bootstrap that relaxes some
restrictions of the more obvious resampling with
replacement procedures. Cameron et al. (2008) show
that this procedure performs well even when the
number of clusters is as few as six.15 In addition, in all
specifications we include industry and year fixed
effects. Taking into consideration that some sectors
are more sensitive to defense, healthcare, and con-
struction policymaking, we run the regression incor-
porating binary variables to represent these factors.
Somecountry-specificdata – suchas rule of law–were
obtained from Transparency International and
reports from central banks of sample countries;
proxies for governance mechanisms were obtained
from theWorld Bank. All financial data aremeasured
in years and thousands of USD.
Table 5 presents the main findings of our basic
model. In the baseline Model 1, we explore the
effect of policy uncertainty on derivative use
intensity – controlling for firm-specific variables.
Most important for our purpose, we find that policy
uncertainty is significantly associated with the
firm’s intensity of derivatives use (p\0.01). The
positive impact of the policy uncertainty index on
the intensity of derivatives use indicates that
greater uncertainty in economic policy increases
firm exposure to risks, thus increasing the incentive
to use derivatives.
Table 5 Determinants for the intensity of derivatives use
Model 1 Model 2
Firm size 0.028***
(0.001)
0.032***
(0.0008)
Leverage 0.011***
(0.007)
0.017***
(0.005)
Interest coverage 0.004
(0.157)
0.005
(0.176)
Capital expenditure 0.022
(0.168)
0.028
(0.107)
Quick ratio 0.0556
(0.102)
0.0188
(0.100)
Dividend yield 0.0565
(0.157)
0.076
(0.102)
FORSALE 0.020
(0.146)
0.028
(0.116)
GEOMART 0.0258**
(0.0015)
0.0256**
(0.026)
Diversification indicator 0.046
(0.147)
0.0576
(0.104)
Cross-listed 0.017
(0.224)
0.0016
(0.248)
GDP per capita 0.276
(0.167)
DEPOSITSTOGDP 0.011
(0.106)
Industry’s fixed effect Yes Yes
Constant 2.26
(1.84)
2.76
(1.76)
No. of observations 3123 3123
No. of firms 881 881
Adjusted R-squared 0.42 0.48
Note: The dependent variable is measured as the notional amount of derivatives use divided by total assets. Given that the dependent variable is
censored at zero we use the Tobit model. All independent variable definitions are reported in Table 1. The coefficients and significance levels are
reported for each model. Policy sensitive sectors include sensitive defense, healthcare, and construction. p values are in parentheses with standard errors
clustered by countries.
 if p\0.10, * if p\0.05; ** if p\0.01; *** if p\0.001.
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Extending the Baseline Model
The role of institutional quality and financial markets
development
This section explores whether the effect of policy
uncertainty on derivatives use remains significant,
even after controlling for the effect of a country’s
institution quality. To measure institution quality,
we use the rule of law index.16 As noted from
Table 5, Model 2, institution quality shows a
marginal effect on firm hedging behavior. Finally,
it is worth noting that integrating institution quality
into the model sustains the significant effect of
policy uncertainty on a firm’s hedging behavior.
Another importantmacro variable thatmay influ-
ence firm hedging behavior is the level of financial
markets. Better developed financial markets moti-
vate firms to use derivatives more. To address this
concern, we use the Global Financial Development
Database, which is an extensive dataset of financial
system characteristics for 203 economies.17 Building
upon Cˇiha´k, Demirgu¨c¸-Kunt, Feyen, and Levine
(2012), we develop an index of financial market
development and incorporate the following four
elements: the size of financial institutions and
markets (financial depth), the degree to which
individuals can and do use financial services (ac-
cess), the efficiency of financial intermediaries and
markets in intermediating resources and facilitating
financial transactions (efficiency), and the stability
of financial institutions and markets (stability).
We then examine whether the effect of EPU on
derivatives use is still significant, even after control-
ling for this index. Table 5, column 3 indicates that
EPU still plays a significant role in driving a firm’s
hedging behavior. The effect of the financial market
development, however, is not significant at any
conventional level. This finding confirms the signif-
icant link between EPU and firm hedging behavior.
Other Macroeconomic Variables
One may wonder whether increases in policy
uncertainty tend to coincide with other macro
shocks and uncertainties, such as recessions, wars,
and financial crises. In this case, the influence of a
firm’s specific and country-level variables may be
captured by policy uncertainty, biasing its effect. In
other words, the Baker et al. (2016) index may in
fact capture – at least partially – the effect of other
general sources of risk and uncertainty on deriva-
tives use. To address this concern, we incorporate
several variables into our main specification, which
capture various aspects of macroeconomic condi-
tions. In particular, we include in the model
institutional quality, country/political risk, finan-
cial soundness indicators (FSIs), and the global
policy uncertainty of our sample countries.18,19
Table 6 presents the main findings.
EPU for Specific Types of Policies
To complete this section, it is worth noting that the
EPU index we have used so far aims to measure
uncertainty in overall policy. We wonder whether
uncertainty in particular types of policy drives more
derivatives use. Given our focus on firm behavior to
hedge against exchange rate risk, we are interested in
policies that would affect the exchange rate. In
particular, we expect that monetary policy, trade
Table 6 Determinants for the intensity of derivatives use—incorporating other macro uncertainties into the model specification
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3
EPU index 0.228**
(0.02)
0.276***
(0.008)
0.284***
(0.005)
Rule of law 0.147*
(0.07)
0.122*
(0.09)
Index of financial market development 0.026*
(0.07)
Global economic uncertainty 0.126*
(0.06)
Control for firm specifics Yes Yes Yes
Industry fixed effect Yes Yes Yes
Year fixed effect Yes Yes Yes
No. of observations 3123 3123 3123
Note: The dependent variable is a continuous variable, which is measured as the notional amount of derivatives use divided by total assets. Given that
the dependent variable is censored at zero we use the Tobit model. Non-derivative users are set to zero. All independent variable definitions are reported
in Table 1. The coefficients and significance levels are reported for each model. p values are in parentheses with standard errors clustered by countries
We use the S&P 500 volatility index (VIX) to proxy for global policy uncertainty. Firm specifics include variables listed in Table 1.
 if p\0.10, * if p\0.05; ** if p\0.01; *** if p\0.001.
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policy, and financial regulation would potentially
affect exchange rate. Building upon the Baker et al.
(2016) method of developing categorical EPU, we
generate an EPU for monetary policy, exchange rate
policy, and financial regulation, respectively.20 To
do so, we use the same set of newspapers used to
construct our general EPU. Next we derive the
categorical EPUs. Each categorical EPU requires our
economic, uncertainty, and policy terms as well as a
set of categorical policy terms. For example, the EPU
for exchange rate is generated by including articles
that fulfill our requirements to be coded as EPU – i.e.,
they include our economic, uncertainty, and policy
terms – as well as a set of the following terms: foreign
exchange rate, forex rate, ER, FX rate, or Agio. For
instance, articles that fulfill our requirements to be
coded as EPU and also contain the term ‘FX rate’
would be included in the foreign exchange EPU.
We then explore whether these categorical EPU
policies would have the same effect on firm hedging
behavior as the overall EPU. Table 7 uses exactly the
same model specification as shown in Table 6,
column 3, thus incorporating institutional quality,
financial market development, and other macro
uncertainty-related variables. The only difference is
that in addition to the overall EPU, we consider EPU
for various types of policies thatmay affect exchange
rate. The key insight we can derive from Table 7 is
that the EPU index for each specific type of policy
shows consistent and positive effects on firm hedg-
ing behavior. Further, these effects have almost the
same magnitude as that of the overall EPU index.
In sum, we find that the explanatory power of the
policy uncertainty index does not get absorbed by
any of the other measures of aggregate uncertainty.
This result stresses the role of policy uncertainty in
driving a firm’s hedging behavior. Furthermore, our
policy uncertainty index – in the spirit of the Baker
et al. (2016) index – contains information about
macroeconomic uncertainty that is not captured by
any of the existing measures used in the literature.
Linking Derivatives Use, EPU Exposure, and Firm
Performance
In this section, we implement the market model –
building upon Adler and Dumas (1984) and Jorion
(1990) – to estimate firms’ level of exposure to EPU.
We then explore whether derivatives use is an
efficient instrument to hedge against EPU exposure
and improve firm performance. In doing so, we
investigate whether using derivatives enables firms
to address EPU exposure more efficiently, in terms
of reducing the effect of EPU on firm performance.
Stage one: Exposure estimation
In line with existing studies (e.g., Allayannis &
Ofek, 2001; Hutson & Stevenson, 2010), we apply
the two-stage approach. In the first stage, we
estimate firm exposure to EPU using the Adler
and Dumas (1984) market model. In the second
stage, we explore the relationship between deriva-
tives use and EPU exposure. The dependent vari-
ables are the coefficients that are estimated by the
market model21 in the first stage.
We use the total monthly sample from January
2003 to December 2013 to estimate the augmented
market model (cross-sectional) regressions.22 For
individual firms, we calculate stock returns in USD,
the USD returns of the corresponding national stock
market index, the EPU index, the percentage change
in trade-weighted effective exchange rate (in local
currency relative to one unit of USD), and interest
rates. We use the one-year Interbank offered rate,
which is compounded monthly, in the data for each
country obtained from Datastream as a proxy for
interest rate.
Table 7 Determinants for the intensity of derivatives use – by overall and specific EPU policy
Overall Monetary policy Exchange rate policy Financial regulation
EPU index 0.28
(0.006)***
0.26
(0.007)***
0.34
(0.002)***
0.226
(0.04)**
Control for firm specifics Yes Yes Yes Yes
Industry fixed effect Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year fixed effect Yes Yes Yes Yes
No. of observations 3123 3123 3123 3123
Note: We use the same model specification shown in Table 6, column 3. In column ‘‘Overall,’’ we use the overall EPU to represent the EPU index. Other
columns are defined likewise.
The dependent variable is a continuous variable measured as the notional amount of derivatives use divided by total assets. Non-derivative users are set
to zero. All independent variable definitions are reported in Table 1. The coefficients and significance levels are reported for each model. p values are in
parentheses with standard errors clustered by countries.
 if p\0.10, * if p\0.05; ** if p\0.01; *** if p\0.001.
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In particular, we estimate for each firm in the
following equations:
Rijt ¼ b0i þ kijtEPUjtþb1ijtRmjt þ eijt
where Rijt is the rate of return on stock of firm i lo-
cated in country j in period t, Rmjt is the rate of return
on country j’s benchmark stock index in period t,
and eitt is the error term clustered by country.
The coefficients kijt represent exposure to EPU. In
line with Allayannis and Ofek’s (2001) definition of
exchange rate exposure, we define exposure to EPU
as the percentage change in the rate of return on a
firm’s common stock against a 1% change in the
EPU index.
Likewise, we estimate the exchange rate exposure
and the exposure to interest rates in the same
manner.
Stage two: Model estimated exposure
In the second stage, we explore the potential effects
of firms’ derivatives use on exposure to EPU. In
particular, we use the estimated exposure coeffi-
cients in the first stage as the dependent variables
in multivariate analysis as follows:23
k^ijt ¼ h0 þ h1Derivativesijt þ vXijt þ gCijt þ eijt
where k^ijt is the value of exposure to EPU estimated
from the first stage of firm i located in country j in
year t, Dijt is the intensity of derivative use for firm
i in year t, Xijt is the vector of firm-specific variables
in year t, including operational hedging, interna-
tional involvement, firm size, and leverage, Cijt is
the country-level variable (GDP per capita, finan-
cial system deposits to GDP, and rule of law), and
eijt is the error term clustered by country.
Table 8 presents the key findings of the estima-
tion. In exploring the relationship between deriva-
tives and exposure to EPU, we uncover some
interesting results. For domestic firms, we observe
that the derivatives use variable is significant and
negatively related to exposure to EPU
(b = - 0.156, p\0.002), which implies that firms
using derivatives reduce exposure by 15.6% for
each 1% increase in the notional value of deriva-
tives. Likewise, in the case of domestic MNCs, we
find a negative relationship between exposure to
EPU and derivatives use, which is higher than
domestic firms. Interestingly, for foreign affiliates,
we do not find any evidence of a significant
relationship between derivatives use and exposure
to host country EPU, though derivatives use has a
negative effect on exposure. In general, the overall
results reported in panel A support Hypothesis 4.
For domestic firms, we also observe that the
derivatives use variable is significant and negatively
related to exposure to EPU. Regarding domestic
MNCs, exposure to country risks decreases when
the general derivatives notional amount increases.
For foreign affiliates, however, we do not find any
evidence supporting a relationship between deriva-
tives use and exposure to host country EPU, though
derivatives use has a negative effect on exposure.
Linking EPU and Firm Performance
From the previous section, it can be found that
corporate derivatives use reduces firms’ exposure to
EPU. An equally interesting question relates to the
role of derivatives use in firm performance. To
address this question, we implement the following
model specification:24
lnGijt ¼ ai þ aepu ln EPUjt þ adDijt þ kepu dEPUjt Dijt
þ aXXijt þ eijtei;j; t ¼ cj; t þ ui;j; t
where Gijt is the performance of firm i in year t –
measured by Tobin’s Q – located in country j, Dijt is
the intensity of derivatives use for firm i in year t,
and Xijt is a vector of firm-specific variables in year t,
including capital expenditures and number of
employees with a degree.
In line with Allayannis and Weston (2001), we
measure firm performance using Tobin’s Q (in
natural logarithm).25 Please refer to Appendix D
for further discussion on our approach to estimate
Tobin’s Q for firms in our sample. Table 9 presents
the main results. The relationship between firm
performance and independent variables is in
expected directions. Interestingly, we find a nega-
tive correlation between cross-listing and firm
value. The negative relationship between cross-
listing and firm value is in line with the finding of
Cetorelli and Peristiani (2015) that firms that use
cross-listing in a less prestigious market experience
a significant decline in valuation over the five years
following the listing. Most relevant to our purpose,
we find that EPU has a negative effect on firm
performance. The magnitude of this effect is great-
est among domestic firms (b = -0.154, p\0.005).
Next, we explore whether firms can reduce the
negative effect of EPU on performance using
derivatives more intensively. We notice a signifi-
cant and positive effect of the interaction term for
all firm types, especially domestic MNCs
(b = 0.0657, p\0.002). This finding suggests that
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Table 8 Exposure and derivatives use
Variables Domestic firms Domestic MNCs Foreign affiliates
Panel A: Exposure to country EPU
Derivative use -0.156***
(0.002)
-0.168***
(0.001)
-0.026
(0.226)
Firm size -1.22
(0.202)
-0.482**
(0.022)
-0.262
(0.157)
Leverage -0.028
(0.268)
-0.0186
(0.466)
0.056
(0.122)
FORSALES 0.056
(0.126)
0.0276*
(0.076)
0.128**
(0.012)
GEOMART -0.276
(0.226)
-0.488
(0.125)
0.206
(0.112)
Cross-listed -0.535
(0.206)
-0.488
(0.146)
-0.546
(0.228)
GDP per capita 0.206
(0.266)
0.225
(0.116)
0.656**
(0.011)
DEPOSITSTOGDP -0.112**
(0.042)
-0.115
(0.125)
-0.062*
(0.084)
Rule of law 3.225
(0.426)
8.56
(0.228)
-0.224*
(0.056)
Intercept 10.22
(0.466)
12.58
(0.168)
18.28**
(0.016)
Country dummies Yes Yes Yes
Industry dummies Yes Yes Yes
Year dummies Yes Yes Yes
No. of observations 2007 1136 198
R-square 0.40 0.42 0.38
Panel B: FX exposure
FCD -0.112***
(0.002)
-0.176*
(0.064)
-0.122
(0.848)
Firm size -0.146*
(0.076)
-0.224
(0.122)
-0.158
(0.226)
Leverage -0.0122
(0.422)
-0.028*
(0.010)
0.076
(0.155)
FORSALES 0.022
(0.566)
0.028
(0.158)
0.028
(0.288)
GEOMART 0.226
(0.284)
-0.022
(0.157)
0.226
(0.206)
Cross-listed 0.156
(0.226)
-0.035
(0.122)
0.225
(0.428)
GDP per capita 0.228***
(0.002)
0.256*
(0.001)
0.112
(0.106)
DEPOSITSTOGDP -0.422***
(0.006)
-0.026**
(0.022)
-0.101**
(0.025)
Rule of law -0.225*
(0.052)
0.205
(0.116)
-0.256
(0.422)
Intercept -2561***
(0.001)
-2645*
(0.072)
-2255
(0.112)
Country dummies Yes Yes Yes
Industry dummies Yes Yes Yes
Year dummies Yes Yes Yes
No. of observations 1053 1250 410
Adjusted R-square 0.224 0.256 0.268
Panel C: IR exposure
IRD -0.284***
(0.002)
-0.225*
(0.076)
-0.215*
(0.076)
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intensifying the use of derivatives enables firms to
address the negative effect of EPU more efficiently,
which supports Hypothesis 3B.
EPU Exposure and the use of derivatives across time –
in pre-crisis, during-crisis, and post- crisis periods
Given the close relationship between EPU and the
global financial crisis of 2007–2008 (Baker et al.,
2016), we are interested in the link between deriva-
tives use and EPU exposure in this context. It has
been well established that firms may be exposed to
two separate and sequential effects of a crisis. On the
one hand, faced with sudden and major external
shocks, firms have difficulty adjusting their risk
management activities to mitigate contagion risks
during a crisis period (Syriopoulos, Makram, &
Boubaker, 2015). On the other hand, when causes
and consequences of a crisis become more obvious,
firms restructure to adjust to a new environment and
reduce risk to EPU exposure. Therefore, we expect
that the effect of derivatives use on EPU exposure is
likely to be worse during the crisis period, but will
improve in the post-crisis period.
Table 10 presents exposure to EPU in relation to
crisis periods. Before the onset of the global finan-
cial crisis, we observe a significant negative rela-
tionship between derivatives use and exposure to
home country risks in the case of domestic firms,
and domestic MNCs. Interestingly, derivatives use
is found to be insignificant at any standard level for
foreign affiliates, though it is inversely associated
with exposure to host country EPU.
During the crisis period, we can observe that
derivatives hedging becomes less effective in reduc-
ing EPU exposure of domestic firms and foreign
affiliates. For domestic MNCs, the use of derivatives
shows a significant negative association with expo-
sure to home country risks, but the effect is modest
in magnitude. These findings are related to the
Allayannis, Brown, and Klapper (2003) observation
of selective hedging among most East Asian, non-
financial firms. In times of financial crisis, market
price and indexes are largely unpredictable in the
short term and display highly increased volatility
around the crisis, thus decreasing the effect of
derivatives hedging. Yet the situation changes in
Table 8 (Continued)
Variables Domestic firms Domestic MNCs Foreign affiliates
Firm size -0.026
(0.226)
-0.084*
(0.052)
-0.068
(0.122)
Leverage -0.026**
(0.026)
-0.015
(0.211)
-0.042**
(0.045)
FORSALES 0.076**
(0.026)
0.068
(0.566)
0.055
(0.682)
GEOMART 0.022
(0.565)
-0.226
(0.152)
0.256
(0.226)
Cross-listed 0.134
(0.630)
-0.100
(0.373)
-0.321
(0.290)
GDP per capita -0.119
(0.905)
-1.639
(0.234)
-1.729
(0.509)
DEPOSITSTOGDP -0.046*
(0.062)
-0.024**
(0.016)
-0.028**
(0.025)
Rule of law -0.582
(0.156)
-0.147
(0.124)
-0.225
(0.146)
Intercept -2.25
(0.56)
-8.24
(0.22)
2.46
(0.46)
Country dummies Yes Yes Yes
Industry dummies Yes Yes Yes
Year dummies Yes Yes Yes
No. of observations 591 2398 430
R-square 0.42 0.46 0.40
Note: This table reports the effects of derivatives use on exposure across domestic firms, MNCs, and foreign affiliates from pooled regression models split
up with regard to exposure to EPU, exchange rate, and interest rate risks. The dependent variables are absolute values of exposure to EPU (panel A),
exchange rate risks (panel B), and interest rate risks (panel C). Derivatives use is the notional value of any derivative contracts in thousands of USD,
scaled by total assets. FCD is the notional value of foreign currency derivatives in thousands of USD, scaled by total assets. IRD is the notional value of
interest rate derivatives in thousands of USD, scaled by total assets. p values are in parentheses. Asterisks ***, **, and * indicate significance at the 1, 5,
and 10% level, respectively.
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the post-crisis period, when the use of derivatives is
more effective in reducing EPU exposure, irrespec-
tive of firm type. The estimated coefficients of
derivatives use show a reduction in exposure to
EPU, especially among domestic MNCs.
MANAGERIAL IMPLICATIONS AND POTENTIAL
FOR FUTURE RESEARCH
Our study explores how firms behave in response to
volatility in economic environments. Uncertainty
in economic policies – regarding their timing,
content, and impact – can make firm investments
riskier, whereby future profitability becomes signif-
icantly more uncertain. Considering that
derivatives are an important risk management
instrument, we explore how uncertainty in eco-
nomic policy is linked to firm performance and
derivatives use. Our findings strongly suggest that
greater policy uncertainty has a negative effect on
the trajectory of firm growth and encourages firms
to hedge more intensively. The policy uncertainty
index is highly significant in all model specifica-
tions – in many cases it is the most significant
determinant of derivatives use and firm perfor-
mance. Interestingly, we find that using derivatives
more intensively enables firms to hedge EPU more
efficiently. Our finding is in line with extant
literature (e.g., Kim et al., 2017) suggesting firms
use derivatives as a risk management instrument.
Table 9 Derivatives use moderates the relationship between EPU and firm performance
Variables Domestic firms Domestic MNCs Foreign affiliates
Derivatives use 0.0528**
(0.029)
0.0466*
(0.057)
0.064*
(0.08)
Derivative 9 EPU 0.0657**
(0.002)
0.0758***
(0.001)
0.0280*
(0.062)
EPU index -0.154***
(0.005)
-0.129***
(0.008)
-0.0828
(0.134)
Firm size 0.945***
(0.000)
0.202***
(0.001)
0.804***
(0.001)
Leverage 0.0719**
(0.019)
0.0651*
(0.081)
-0.0906
(0.112)
Capital expenditure 0.0307
(0.242)
0.0304**
(0.015)
-0.0885
(0.836)
Cross-listed -0.0612
(0.647)
-0.0264
(0.127)
-0.0119***
(0.002)
Dividend yield -0.0104
(0.577)
0.0306**
(0.014)
0.0149
(0.256)
FORSALE -0.0466*
(0.077)
0.0350
(0.643)
-0.0685
(0.994)
GEOMART -0.211
(0.166)
0.0335
(0.570)
0.0913
(0.776)
Diversification indicator -0.0566
(0.747)
-0.0578
(0.289)
-0.835**
(0.013)
GDP per capita 0.0676
(0.967)
-0.6170
(0.188)
0.479**
(0.010)
DEPOSITSTOGDP 0.0033
(0.883)
-0.0038*
(0.091)
0.0069
(0.261)
Intercept -2.915
(0.812)
3.472
(0.422)
-62.01***
(0.002)
Country dummies Yes Yes Yes
Industry dummies Yes Yes Yes
Year dummies Yes Yes Yes
No. of observations 1420 1431 272
R-square 0.413 0.367 0.533
Note: This table reports the effects of derivatives use on firm performance from an OLS estimation split up with regard to domestic firms, domestic
MNCs, and foreign affiliates. The dependent variable is Ln (Tobin’s Q), which is calculated as the natural logarithm of book value of total assets minus
book value of equity plus the market value of equity over book value of total assets. Derivatives use is calculated as the notional value of derivative
contracts in thousands of USD, scaled by total assets. Standard errors are clustered by country to control for heteroscedasticity and serial correlation.
p values are in parentheses. Asterisks ***, **, and * indicate significance at the 1, 5, and 10% level, respectively.
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Overall, our study contributes to the literature by
highlighting the importance of national policy
uncertainty in driving firm hedging behavior. That
the explanatory power of the policy uncertainty
index is not absorbed by any other measures of
aggregate uncertainty suggests not only that policy
uncertainty has an effect on firm performance and
hedging behavior, but also that the Baker et al.
(2016) EPU index contains information about
macroeconomic uncertainty not captured by any
of the existing measures used in the literature. A
potential direction for future research could cover a
broader range of countries with more heteroge-
neous economic uncertainty; heterogeneity will
allow researchers to further explore the effect of
policy uncertainty on firm behaviors, including
derivatives use.
Managerial Implication
Our study also has direct practical and meaningful
implications for firm managers on decisions related
to capital structure. In particular, the research
provides new evidence that in East Asian countries
EPU has a negative effect on firm performance; yet
derivatives use is effective in reducing exposure to
home country EPU. These findings suggest that
firms could influence the cost of capital in partic-
ular, and capital structure in general by the use of
financial derivatives, and thus firm managers better
perform the important tasks of strategic capital
planning and managing risks.
Despite our significant contributions to the
growing body of research on derivatives use and
exposure, this research has several limitations.
First, our sample consists of countries with great
variances regarding the level of institutional and
economic development. On the one hand, the
robust results on the link between EPU, EPU
exposure, and firm performance – after controlling
for country’s heterogeneity – prove that our find-
ings can be useful in various environments. On the
other hand, substantial differences exist among
these countries in terms of derivatives use, firm
scale, and multinational corporations, which
makes us wonder whether our study implications
are consistent and applicable for all of these
countries. A potential direction for future studies
is to conduct a more in-depth comparable study on
the link between EPU exposure, derivatives use, and
firm performance. In doing so, could we explicitly
estimate the role of culture and institutional qual-
ity in moderating the relationship between EPU
exposure, derivatives use, and firm performance by
firm type.
Secondly, we estimate the derivative intensity
using the notional value of derivative contracts
held by each firm. We did so because sample firms
are not required to report detailed information on
specific positions of notional holdings, regarding
derivatives holdings disclosures. Although total
notional value effectively measures derivative own-
ership, more details on how firms actually use
derivatives would be helpful. For example, a firm
might state that they use a certain amount of
money for foreign currency hedging. If so, it would
be interesting to know if this is actually related to
transfer pricing, or other motives. If data are
available, future research should address these
issues not only in the context of countries from
South East Asia but also for other groups of
countries.
Third, while the number of sample foreign
affiliates identifies the effects of derivatives use on
exposure relatively well, a bigger sample could
provide a better view and evidence on that effect.
Thus, a potential direction for future research could
cover a broader range of foreign affiliates in a wider
range of countries, which will allow researchers to
further explore the differences in the effects
between foreign-owned firms and domestic-owned
firms.
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NOTES
1Financial derivatives are defined as financial instru-
ments whose prices are dependent on or derived from
the value of other, more basic underlying variables
(Hull, 2012: 1). An underlying variable is a market-
related characteristic of the asset or liability that leads
to an increase in value changes (Gastineau, Smith, and
Todd, 2001). They can be equity shares, stocks,
bonds, debentures, treasury bills, foreign currencies,
interest rates, commodity prices, or different market
indices, such as the stock market index or the
consumer price index (Anderson & Gupta, 2009). In
this article, we focused on total derivatives, and the
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most common and widely practiced types of non-
financial firms, i.e., foreign currency (Aretz & Bartram,
2010). We also conduct an analysis with other types of
derivatives, such as interest rates. It is worth noting
that foreign currency derivatives are settled at a
specific future date, and their values are derived from
changes in foreign currencies.
2As in Frank Knight (1921), we define uncertainty as
individuals’ inability to forecast the likelihood of events
happening. In contrast, Knight defined risk as people’s
known probability distribution over known events. For
example, the outcome from flipping a coin is risky –
you can assign a 50% chance to heads and a 50%
chance to tails for a fair toss. In this study, we refer to a
single concept of uncertainty, although this will
typically be a stand-in for both risk and uncertainty.
3More recent news about the rapid decline in
Chinese stock prices from late June 2015 provides a
practical example of how policy uncertainty may
influence firm behavior. In response to concern about
the equity bubble, the Chinese government launched
a series of initiatives in the first half of 2015 that
tightened the margin finance – the use of borrowed
money to buy shares – after relaxing it during the
previous five years. The restrictions culminated in a
June 12 announcement of a new limit on the total
amount of margin lending. The stock market reacted
immediately and stock prices have fallen ever since.
More than 1400 stocks – about half of all listed
companies – suspended from trading. Hundreds of
Chinese companies have withdrawn from the market,
while retail investors have rushed to unwind leveraged
bets on the market. Such responsive behavior from
firms led to the loss of $3000 billion from the value of
all listed firms.3 As the Financial Times suggests, a firm’s
reluctance to participate in the market is likely related
to new rules, making the growth outlook for China’s
economy appear more uncertain. Thus, we explore
whether firms use derivatives more intensively in
response to this uncertainty.
4The 2014 annual survey of the Future Industry
Association reveals that trading in the Asia–Pacific
region amounts to $7.25 billion, accounting for about
one-third of global trading volume.
5Our study is also related to rapidly growing liter-
ature on text search methods – using newspaper
archives in particular – to measure a variety of
outcomes. Examples include Gentzkow and Shapiro
(2010); Hoberg and Phillips (2010); Boudoukh et al.,
(2013), and Alexopoulos and Cohen (2015). Our work
suggests that newspaper text searches can yield useful
proxies for economic and policy conditions stretching
back several decades, which could be especially
valuable in analyzing earlier eras and countries with
fewer data sources.
6For example, Colombo (2013) finds that a one
standard deviation shock to the US economic policy
uncertainty index leads to a statistically significant fall
in European industrial production and prices. Handley
and Limao (2012) find that trade policy uncertainty
delays firm entry, and Gulen and Ion (2015) find
negative responses of corporate investment to the EPU
index. Gunnemann (2014) develops a policy uncer-
tainty index, which relates to the Baker et al. (2016)
EPU index, and is based on over 60 million newspaper
articles. The author finds that an increase in economic
policy uncertainty appears to have a little impact on
industrial production and unemployment across the
various economies. Aastveit et al. (Aastveit, Natvik, &
Sola, 2013) explore the interactive effect of economic
uncertainty and monetary policy on economic activ-
ities. They find that monetary policy shocks affect
economic activity significantly less when policy uncer-
tainty is high.
7Baker et al. (2016) collect a list of related papers
and refer to them on the following website: http://
www.policyuncertainty.com/research.html
8Overall, Guay and Kothari (2003) suggest rethink-
ing past empirical research on firms’ derivatives use.
9Pa´stor and Veronesi (2012, 2013) note that uncer-
tainty cannot be fully mitigated by diversification.
10Procedures to develop the index can be found
here: http://www.policyuncertainty.com/media/
Coding_Guide.pdf.
11Like Baker et al. (2016), we also conducted an
audit by asking our research assistant to do a manual
search of the mentioned newspaper in 2005, for the
selected terms. The audit provided a similar result to
the EPU we use here.
12We exclude financial firms, as these firms are
financial intermediaries; they are derivative traders
rather than end-users. More specifically, they enter
into derivative contracts for trading purposes on their
own account, or on behalf of their customers.
13We focus on domestic MNE firms among 881
firms in our sample.
14We also conduct an analysis with other types of
derivatives, such as interest rate and commodity price
derivatives. Also, we conduct a two-way clustering –
by country and industry – of the baseline model. The
findings are consistent with what this study reports;
they are available from the authors upon request.
15To proceed with this procedure, we use the
module CLUSTSE in Stata.
16This index measures the quality of public and civil
services, and the credibility of a government’s
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commitment to policies. We position all of these
variables on a scale from -2.5 (weak governance) to
2.5 (strong governance), which we obtained from the
World Bank.
17As an alternative, building upon Alesina and
Perotti (1996) to capture political instability within
the country, we can use the Political Risk variable from
the World Bank. The main findings are consistent with
what we report in this article.
18Regarding global policy uncertainty, and given the
highly international involvement of firms in our sam-
ple, we expect that fluctuation in the global market
would induce firms to use derivatives more intensively
in response to such fluctuation. An interesting ques-
tion is whether firm hedging behavior is more sensitive
to global policy uncertainty, or a country’s specific
policy uncertainty. To capture the effect of global
economic uncertainty, we use the S&P 500 volatility
index (VIX) to proxy for global policy uncertainty,
which follows numerous studies (see Baker et al.,
2016). We include VIX in Tables 4 and 5, Model 3.
19The estimated coefficient of VIX is insignificant, yet
policy uncertainty still shows a significant effect on the
intensity of derivatives use. This finding again points to
the significant effect of policy uncertainty on a firm’s
hedging behavior, which is not captured by the effect
of global uncertainty. Finally, it is worth noting that
the interaction between institution quality and EPU is
still negative and significant in all model specifications.
20The Baker et al. (2016) Categorical Data include a
range of sub-indexes based solely on news data. These
are derived using results from the Access World News
database of over 2000 US newspapers. Each sub-index
requires our economic, uncertainty, and policy terms,
as well as a set of categorical policy terms. For
instance, articles that fulfill our requirements for
coding as EPU – and also contain the term ‘federal
reserve’ – would be included in the monetary policy
uncertainty sub-index. The list of categories can be
found here: http://www.policyuncertainty.com/
categorical_terms.html.
21Market model is developed by Adler and Dumas
(1984) and augmented by Jorion (1990).
22Daily and weekly data are noisier and usually
afflicted by non-synchroneity problems (Allayannis &
Ofek, 2001).
23In the multivariate tests, we use absolute rather
than actual estimated exposure because the sign of
exposure just measures the direction of risk exposure,
while the magnitude of exposure is more important
(Faff & Marshall, 2005).
24It is likely that endogeneity exists in this model’s
specification. Better performing firms may have more
incentive to use derivatives. As such, we also check the
following model’s specifications: a) include previous
year performance (lagged Y) and see whether the
main findings hold; b) lag the main predictors – level
of EPU and derivatives use – by one period; and c) run
a reverse regression to see whether increasing firm
performance has an effect on the intensity of deriva-
tives use. We find that the key findings are sustained.
However, there is also some evidence of endogeneity,
i.e., firms with better performance are more likely to
use derivatives more intensively.
25We also consider other measures of firm perfor-
mance – commonly used in the literature – such as sale
level per employee. We arrive at much the same
results; please refer to Appendix B for further details.
26FT 500 2013, http://www.ft.com/indepth/ft500,
Financial Times.
27Business Times, http://www.businesstimes.com.
sg/companies-markets/ranking-of-singapore-companies
-by-market-capitalisation-0.
28It is worth noting that there are a relatively great
number of missing observations in our data analysis.
The main reason is that we randomly selected firms,
and the missing variables differ from firm to firm. For
example, some firms have information about deriva-
tives, yet do not have information about leverage.
Other firms have missing variables on derivatives;
however, they have information about leverage.
29Lewellen and Badrinath (1997) explain that asset
vintages are assets in place for a firm on the date
when a replacement cost measure is desired.
30LIFO stands for ‘‘Last in, First out,’’ an inventory
accounting. In this method of accounting, the last
items placed into the firm’s inventory are supposed to
be the first ones sold (see Perfect &Wiles, 1994).
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APPENDIX A
Linking EPU, Derivatives Use, and Firm Performance: Using Alternative Measures of Firm Performance
See Table 11.
APPENDIX B
See Table 12.
Table 11 Determinants of firm performance (measured by log of sales level per employee)
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4
Firm size (Log) 0.268**
(0.025)
0.255*
(0.032)
0.422***
(0.001)
0.477***
(0.001)
Derivative intensity 0.277
(0.08)
0.266
(0.122)
0.164
(0.142)
EPU -0.577*
(0.026)
-0.528*
(0.046)
-0.622***
(0.008)
EPU 9 Derivative intensity 0.226***
(0.001)
Cross-listed 0.001
(0.157)
0.006
(0.112)
0.002
(0.228)
0.008
(0.116)
Control for firm specifics Yes Yes Yes Yes
Control for other macro variables Yes Yes Yes Yes
Adjusted R2 0.40 0.42 0.47 0.48
No. of firms 881 881 881 881
No. of observations 3123 3123 3123 3123
Note: The dependent variable is the firm’s sales level per worker in natural logarithm. The coefficients and significance levels are reported for each
model. We used year and industry fixed effects in all models. p values are in parentheses.
 if p\0.10, * if p\0.05; ** if p\0.01; *** if p\0.001.
Table 12 Fixed Effects Model
Variables Domestic firms Domestic MNCs Foreign affiliates
Panel A: Country risks
DER -0.1248**
(0.028)
-0.1476***
(0.001)
0.0259
(0.585)
Firm size -0.1391
(0.470)
-0.302*
(0.073)
-0.645
(0.102)
Leverage -0.0346
(0.401)
0.0449
(0.563)
-0.0343**
(0.024)
FORSALES 0.068*
(0.065)
0.0108
(0.536)
0.0707**
(0.049)
GEOMART 0.3688
(0.468)
0.2841
(0.111)
-0.2539
(0.334)
Cross-listed -0.2883
(0.361)
0.2369*
(0.088)
-0.0984
(0.965)
GDP per capita 0.568**
(0.046)
-0.1033
(0.457)
-0.0302
(0.976)
DEPOSITSTOGDP -0.819
(0.340)
-0.120**
(0.038)
-0.0689**
(0.039)
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Table 12 (Continued)
Variables Domestic firms Domestic MNCs Foreign affiliates
Rule of law 0.4911
(0.912)
0.1339
(0.536)
-0.6676**
(0.021)
Intercept 20.21
(0.859)
189.8
(0.349)
3.372
(0.786)
Country dummies Yes Yes Yes
Industry dummies Yes Yes Yes
Year dummies Yes Yes Yes
No. of observations 2007 2506 438
Panel B: FX exposure
FCD -0.1010***
(0.007)
-0.1311*
(0.088)
-0.138
(0.957)
Firm size -0.2095***
(0.003)
-0.0178*
(0.066)
-0.1636*
(0.057)
Leverage -0.0778
(0.604)
-0.0395*
(0.056)
0.0515
(0.868)
FORSALES 0.0258
(0.335)
0.0391
(0.476)
0.0340
(0.949)
GEOMART -0.767
(0.631)
-0.0323
(0.435)
0.1491
(0.516)
Cross-listed 0.1579
(0.469)
-0.0395
(0.177)
-0.1297
(0.973)
GDP per capita -0.3777
(0.105)
0.185**
(0.049)
0.651**
(0.025)
DEPOSITSTOGDP -0.103***
(0.006)
-0.0472**
(0.020)
-0.1971
(0.409)
Rule of law -0.4592
(0.291)
0.159
(0.430)
-0.4365
(0.878)
Intercept 51.52
(0.135)
-2.404*
(0.067)
149.4
(0.396)
Country dummies Yes Yes Yes
Industry dummies Yes Yes Yes
Year dummies Yes Yes Yes
No. of observations 1053 1250 410
Panel C: IR exposure
IRD -0.1630**
(0.018)
-0.1750**
(0.046)
-0.0307*
(0.092)
Firm size -0.565
(0.878)
-0.0737**
(0.041)
-0.0659
(0.470)
Leverage -0.0960
(0.911)
-0.0235**
(0.012)
-0.0217*
(0.100)
FORSALES 0.397**
(0.037)
0.0110
(0.594)
0.0747
(0.924)
GEOMART -0.186
(0.989)
-0.107
(0.433)
0.2165
(0.454)
Cross-listed 0.1757
(0.860)
-0.107
(0.253)
-0.3521
(0.493)
GDP per capita -0.1909***
(0.000)
-0.876
(0.516)
-0.2480**
(0.041)
DEPOSITSTOGDP -0.4486***
(0.000)
-0.0432***
(0.000)
-0.0563**
(0.044)
Rule of law -0.2236***
(0.002)
0.420
(0.320)
-0.3139
(0.115)
Intercept 1522.9***
(0.000)
8.560
(0.487)
6.953
(0.836)
Country dummies Yes Yes Yes
Policy uncertainty, Hedging behavior, and FDI Quang Nguyen and Trang Kim
Journal of International Business Studies
APPENDIX C
Sample Selection
Our sample includes 881 non-financial firms across
34 different industries in the period of 2003–2013.
Following most prior studies, we selected the top-
listed companies ranked by market capitalization on
the stock exchanges of the eight countries in the
sample. We obtained the list of Japanese firms from
the Financial Times list of the Japan FT500;26 the list
of Singapore companies from the Business Times;27
and for other companies, we obtain information on
the rankingof listedcompanies fromwebsitesof stock
exchanges of each country and from the list of
Bloomberg. We excluded firms that did not have
annual reports in English or did not have annual
reports from 2003 to 2013. Finally, we have a sample
of 881 non-financial firms in total, including 149
Singapore firms, 151 Japanese firms, 103 Thai firms,
146 Hong Kong firms, 101 Chinese firms, 160
Malaysian firms, 39 Indonesian firms, and 32 Philip-
pino firms.
There are two main reasons why we chose large
firms. Firstly, large firms were more likely to be
involved in international business activities and
thereby have exposure to financial risks. Because
manyfirmsare expected tohave exposure tofinancial
risks, our sample potentially provides a rich cross-
section of derivatives users and non-users. Secondly,
there was a high likelihood that large firms were
actively encouraged to report their derivatives usage
in their annual reports during the sample period.
We chose the period of 2003–2013 for investiga-
tion because our data span the global financial
crisis of 2007–2008, which generated real exoge-
nous shocks to firms, thereby providing us a unique
natural experiment of derivatives use and financial
risks, and allows us to provide new insights into
firms’ hedging activities and economic policy
uncertainty before, during, and after that turbulent
period.
We also thought about sample selection bias
given a great number of missing observations in our
study.28 For instance, firms might report derivatives
in years with high EPU. To investigate potential
bias, we use a simple t test to check variables such
as the amount of derivatives, EPU, and other
country-level controls. We do not find systematic
difference between the missing observations and
the available observations. Next, we implement a
Heckman correction model (1976) where two
equations are developed: one for selection and the
other for the dependent variable. These two equa-
tions are estimated simultaneously. It is worth
noting that a probit estimation of the selection
model is used in the primary regression model to
test if there is a significant selection bias. We use
firm specifics, industry and year binaries, EPU, and
other country variables to estimate the selection
model to check if the observations that are not
included in our main models are systematically
different from those that are included in the main
models. It is noted that the two-stage estimator
method only outperforms an ordinary least squares
(OLS) method if selection bias is severe (Berk,
1983). We find that neither is the sample selection
bias significant nor do the regression coefficients
substantially differ between the two-step estimator
and the OLS models. As such, we use OLS regression
models with robust standard errors in our
estimations.
APPENDIX D
Estimation of Tobin’s Q
Pantzalis, Simkins, & Laux (2001) define foreign
affiliate as an independent organizational unit,
which is located in any sample country, wholly or
partially managed and controlled by a foreign
parent multinational corporation (MNC). As such,
our sample foreign affiliates have their own
Table 12 (Continued)
Variables Domestic firms Domestic MNCs Foreign affiliates
Industry dummies Yes Yes Yes
Year dummies Yes Yes Yes
No. of observations 2061 2398 430
Note: This table presents the impacts of derivatives use on exposure across domestic firms, domestic MNCs, and foreign affiliates from fixed effects
models. The dependent variables are absolute values of exposure to EPU (panel A), exchange rate risks (panel B), and interest rate risks (panel C). DER is
the notional value of any derivative contracts in thousands of USD, scaled by total assets. FCD is the notional value of foreign currency derivatives in
thousands of USD, scaled by total assets. IRD is the notional value of interest rate derivatives in thousands of USD, scaled by total assets. p values are in
parentheses. Asterisks ***, **, and * indicate significance at the 1, 5, and 10% level, respectively.
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independent balance sheets and financial state-
ments with separate market prices. Thus, data of
their market prices are available on Datastream
database, and we obtained those data from Datas-
tream. On that basis, we calculated Tobin’s Q for
every foreign affiliate.
Regarding our Tobin’s Q calculation, we would
like to introduce and describe it in details below.
Since its introduction to the literature of finan-
cial economics approximately a half of century ago,
Tobin’s Q has become an increasingly popular
measure of firm performance. As defined by
Brainard and Tobin (1968) and Tobin (1969),
Tobin’s Q is the ratio between the firm’s market
value and the replacement cost of its capital stock,
this ratio has become known as Tobin’s average
Q or Tobin’s Q in short. As such, they argue that
investment is stimulated when capital is valued
more highly in the market than it costs to manu-
facture it, and deterred when its valuation is less
than its replacement cost. Another way to indicate
the same point is that firms which display Tobin’s
Q greater than unity are judged as using scare
resources effectively, and those firms with Tobin’s
Q less than unity are considered as using resources
poorly. Because of that, Brainard & Tobin (1968)
and Tobin (1969) propose that this ratio be used to
measure the firm’s incentive to invest in capital.
To the best of our knowledge, Allayannis and
Weston (2001) are the first to apply this methodol-
ogy to examine the effect of derivatives use on firm
value. Following Allayannis and Weston (2001),
among others, we define Tobin’s Q as the ratio of
firm’s market value to replacement costs of assets,
evaluated at the end of the fiscal year for each firm.
We then need to estimate Tobin’s Q for each firm in
the sample. Lindenberg and Ross (1981) developed a
methodology for measuring Tobin’s Q, which has
become the roadmap for subsequent studies, in
which it is expressed as follows:
Our methodology for constructing market value
of the firm closely follows Perfect and Wiles (1994),
Lewellen and Badrinath (1997), Allayannis and
Weston (2001). According to Perfect and Wiles
(1994), market value of a firm in year t is the sum of
year-end market values of equity, debt, and pre-
ferred stock. The year-end market value of a firm’s
equity is estimated by year-end per share stock price
multiplied by the number of outstanding shares.
Market value of a firm’s preferred stock is the total
preferred dividends capitalized by preferred stock
yield index.
Lewellen and Badrinath (1997) and Allayannis
and Weston (2001) propose somewhat different
estimation of the firm’s market value. In their
estimation, market value of a firm consists of short-
term debt, long-term debt, preferred stock, and
common stock. They suppose that short-term debt
has a market value equal to book value, while long-
term debt is estimated using a recursive methodol-
ogy that measures maturity structure of a firm’s
long-term debt and accounts for changes in the
yield on A-rated industrial bonds. Additionally, the
market value of common stock is estimated by year-
end share price multiplied by the number of
outstanding shares. Lewellen and Badrinath
(1997) estimate preferred stock as annual dividend
obligations divided by the prevailing yield on
medium grade preferred, while Allayannis and
Weston (2001) measure market value of preferred
stock using the year-end redemption value, which
is suggested by Lang and Stulz (1994).
By the same token, to calculate the replacement
cost of assets, we follow the procedure outlined in
studies by Perfect and Wiles (1994), Lewellen and
Badrinath (1997), Allayannis and Weston (2001).
Perfect and Wiles (1994) note that a firm’s assets
can be decomposed into three constituents:
(a) plant and equipment, (b) inventories, and
(c) others. The replacement costs of plant, equip-
ment, and inventories are estimated using three
methodologies that employ a firm’s replacement
cost estimates or time series estimates based on
historical data or both. The first methodology uses
replacement cost figures provided by the firm. The
second method is derived from the model of
Lindenberg and Ross (1981), and the third tech-
nique calculates the end-of-year book value of a
firm’s total assets.
In this study, we follow Lewellen and Badrinath
(1997), Allayannis and Weston (2001) approach of
constructing replacement cost of assets, which is
both simpler and more accurate. In their procedure,
the replacement cost of assets is estimated as the
sum of replacement cost of fixed assets plus inven-
tories. As such, they calculate the replacement cost
of fixed assets by deducing the vintages29 and
Market value of the firm
Total replacement cost of assets 
Tobin’s Q =
Market value (equity + debt + preferred stock)
Replacement cost (plant + equipment + inventories)
=
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depreciation pattern of in-place gross fixed assets.
In addition, the replacement cost of inventories is
measured as the sum of book value of inventories
plus LIFO30 reserves. Allayannis and Weston (2001)
demonstrate that the advantage of this methodol-
ogy for estimating replacement cost is that it does
not hinge on any initial conditions or ‘‘recursive
build-up’’ period, which can lead to a serious
impact on both the magnitude and ranking of
Tobin’s Q across firms as indicated by Lewellen and
Badrinath (1997).
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